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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
DETERMINATIONS
HUBERT H. MARGOLIES*
Old man Minick's contemporary in another midwestern
state had been unable to initiate the necessary arrangements
for entering a private institution. With the crash the value
of his investments had declined to the point where the only
course open to him was to live with his son-in-law and daugh-
ter. He was not unwelcome, but an atmosphere of dutiful
sacrifice pervaded the apartment.
Then the state enacted its old-age assistance law under
which it obtained Federal participation in half the total of
all assistance payments. One day when the fact of his de-
pendency bore on him rather more heavily than usual Min-
ick's contemporary went to the local welfare office and filled
out an application. In a few weeks he received a letter
notifying him that he had been found ineligible for old-age
assistance because he was not in need, but that he was en-
titled to a hearing before the State department. Since it
seemed obvious that he had no income, he returned to the
local office where it was explained that an individual re-
ceiving all support from a son-in-law was not in need. Min-
ick's contemporary then demanded a hearing before the
State agency.
His son-in-law failed to attend the hearing. The ap-
plicant testified that he had become a burden, that he had
no money of his own, and that he was entitled to assistance.
The case worker's tale was not substantially different, ex-
cept that reference was made to the deeding of some prop-
erty to the son-in-law three years ago, when he had been
in arrears on his taxes. The hearing was informal and the
representatives of the State department had been sympathetic
and understanding. Nevertheless, two weeks later the ap-
plicant was informed that the decision of the State depart-
ment on the fair hearing was that the support and main-
tenance furnished by his son-in-law disqualified him.
When the son-in-law learned of the determination he
* Attorney, office of the General Counsel, Federal Security Agency.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of its author
exclusively and may not be attributed to the Federal Security
Agency or the Social Security Board.
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was indignant. He immediately retained a local attorney to
handle the appeal to the district court.
Thus far, the situation has been viewed exclusively from
the standpoint of the applicant. Is the determination as
arbitrary as it seemed to him, or is there another side with
which he was unfamiliar? This article will discuss the at-
titude of courts and their role with respect to agency de-
terminations as to old-age assistance, aid to the blind, and
aid to dependent children," when the applicant and his friends
are not satisfied that he has received fair treatment.
The Federal Social Security Act requires as a condition
of approval of State plans for public assistance that an
applicant or recipient, dissatisfied with the preliminary de-
cision by the local agency in a program supervised by the
State department or by the field employees in a program
administered by the State department, be granted an oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing before the State agency.2 Thus,
before a case reaches the courts, the administrative tribunal,
a superior and revising body not only at liberty but required
to reach its own conclusions, passes on the claim and the
State agency has given its imprimatur following a hearing
to the person aggrieved by the preliminary action. The ad-
ministrative tribunal bar presumptions in favor of the cor-
rectness of the initial decision and reaches its decision on
the basis of the fair hearing record. The fair hearing de-
vice provides assurance that full consideration has been
given to the circumstances of the individual's case by ex-
perienced persons and, concurrently, that any local devia-
tions have been aligned with the established agency policies.
An exercise of local discretion will not survive the hearing
unless it is in accord with that of the administrative tribunal.
As a practical matter the nisi prius court in the county of
appellant's residence may not be able to view the case from
as favorable a vantage-ground as the administrative tribunal
and with comparable regard for the State-wide implications
of its decision.3
'The subject of welfare activities in the courts is treated in A. D.
Smith, Judicial Trends in Relation to Public Welfare Administra-
tion (June, 1941) Social Service Review.
2 The Social Security Board on January 8, 1941, released its PnNCILrS
AND STANDARDS FOR FAIR HFARING PROCEDURES IN PUBLIC AsSIST-
ANC E ADmINISTRATION.
3 See Rasmussen v. County of Hennepin, 207 Minn. 28, 32, 289 N.W. 773,
775 (1940). On the value of fair hearing procedures in preserving
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Wide diversity as to the avenues to the courts exists. It
ranges from express denial4 and complete silence to ampli-
tude, and unquestionably affects the type of review.5 Never-
theless, on the basis of partial returns, with most of the
jurisdictions to be heard from, some trends can be seen to
emerge.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, that the State agen-
cy must be upheld if there is evidence in the fair hearing
record to support its findings of fact7 and that its interpre-
tation of the law8 is to be accorded "some" respect, are ob-
served in public assistance litigation in the highest courts.
The availability of judicial review connotes that "the final
word upon this question [what the law is] must be spoken
by the courts."9 There is a discernible lag in the lower court
decisions."' The absence of decisions of courts of last resort
reversing affirmances of agency determinations is of par-
ticular significance", since it is not at all uncommon for the
the integrity of agency decisions, see Orfield, Old Age Assistance:
With Special Reference to Nebraska (1938) 17 Neb. L. Bull. 287,
304-5; Hunter, The Courts and Administrative 'Fair Hearings' in
Public Assistance Programs (1940) 14 Social Service Review 481.
4 See Miss. Laws 1936, c. 175, §28: "No suit shall be maintained in any
court for the purpose of compelling an award of assistance or to
enforce payment of any award of assistance made under the pro-
visions of this act."
5 See Smith, supra, note 1.
Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 617 (4th
Dept. 1941); Oklahoma Public Welfare Comm. v. Thompson, 105
P. (2d) 547 (Okla. 1940); McAvoy v. Ernst, 196 Wash. 416, 83 P.(2d) 245 (1938); State ex rel. Lung v. Superior Court, 193 Wash.
365, 76 P. (2d) 306 (1938). The reported decision in the Thompson
case was on rehearing. The original decision of the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma, holding that it was unnecessary to exhaust the ad-
ministrative remedies because the applicant believed that a fair
hearing would not be available, is discussed in Hunter, supra note 3,
at 496. See generally Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress from
Erroneous Administrative Action (1941) 25 Minn. L. Rev. 560-587.
T Schneberger v. State Board of Social Welfare, 291 N.W. 859 (Iowa
1940); Chapman v. State Social Security Comm., 147 S.W. (2d)
157 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941); Cf. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co.,
26 N.E. (2d) 399 (Ind. 1940).
8 Rasmussen v. County of Hennepin, supra note 3; see Hormel v. Helver-
ing, 61 S. Ct. 719, 721 (1941); Final Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941) pp. 90-91.
9 Howlett v. State Social Security Comm., Mo. Sup. Ct., March 22, 1941.
10 See Howlett v. State Social Security Comm., 146 S.W. (2d) 94
(Springfield Ct. App. 1940), rev'd Mo. Sup. Ct., March 22, 1941;
White v. State Social Security Comm., 345 Mo. 1046, 137 S.W.
(2d) 569 (1940).
11 In re Application of Seidel, 204 Minn. 357, 283 N.W. 742 (1939) is
not an exception. The issue was one of county liability and applicant
was not affected by the outcome.
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highest courts to adopt views differing from those of the
agency and the lower courts.
Findings of fact based on evidence are given the weight
of a jury verdict.12 While the formulations differ,13 there
is general agreement in the application of the principle of
finality.14  On the other hand, the novelty of the delegation
to an administrative body of penultimate power to construe
the law has militated against the acceptance of such dele-
gation by the courts in some jurisdictions. They appear to
pass on issues of law independently of the administrative
interpretation5 Courts in other jurisdictions recognize that
having the last word is not necessarily incompatible with
judicial self-limitation.
Court affirmances of agency determinations are rested
on a multitude of grounds, such as the separation of powers,'6
the necessity of conforming with the single State agency re-
quirements of the Social Security Act,17 and the theory that
administrative determinations relating to claims for bounties
or gratuities may be conclusive.'8 In spite of their multiple
grounds the decisions form a consistent pattern readily ex-
plicable by the unwillingness of the appellate courts to have
32 Chapman v. State Social Security Comm., supra note 7, at 159; Clay
v. State Social Security Comm., 143 S.W. (2d) 165 (Springfield Ct
App. 1940).
13 In Adams v. Ernst, 1 Wash. (2d) 254, 95 P. (2d) 799 (1939) the
court said: "The decision of the administrative board must be
deemed prima facie correct and must prevail unless it can be said
that the evidence preponderates against it."
'4 See Final Report, supra note 8, pp. 91-92, 210-212.
15 In theHowlett case, supra note 9, the court said: "A given proposition
either is the law or it is not. There is no middle ground." See
(1939) 13 Social Service Review 105-110. But cf. Helvering v.
Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 et seq. (1939).
16A provision for trial de novo was invalidated in Borreson v. Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14 N.E. (2d) 485 (1938), ap-
proved Smith, supra note 1; Shneider, The Social Security Act in
Operation (1938) 17 Neb. L. Bull. 145, 147 (Bar Proc.); criticized
(1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 639; (1939) Ill. B. J. 203. The Borreson
decision was adhered to in Brown v. State Department, 369 Ill. 543,
17 N.E. (2d) 221 (1938). Thereafter the procedure for relief was
by way of mandamus. Freeman v. Department of Public Welfare,
368 Ill. 505, 534 14 N.E. (2d) 642 (1938).
'7Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 447, 92 P. (2d) 273 (1939).
l8Wilkie v. O'Connor, supra note 6. But cf. Proffitt v. Christian County,
370 Ill. 530, 19 N.E. (2d) 345, 347 (1939). In the Howlett case,
supra note 9, acceptance of this view is accompanied by dicta to the
effect that a ruling on the law contrary to that of the court is
arbitrary and unreasonable per se. An affirmative indication of
legislative intent to cut off appropriate judicial review was required
in Wood v. Waggoner, 293 N.W. 188 (S. D. 1940).
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the judiciary assume the burden and responsibility for the
administration of inadequate funds. Public assistance is a
branch of the law not bowed under by an accumulation of
judicial precedents and the granting of administrative free-
dom is facilitated thereby.
"The State Board having been given so much to operate on
for that period, and no more, it then became its duty under
the Act to adopt a policy which would best subserve the cause
of old age assistance within the means furnished for that
purpose. Whether it would be wiser for it to pay full quotas
and prematurely expend most, if not all, of the entire fund
appropriated for the given period, or whether the needy aged
now qualified to receive payments and the ever increasing
number of prospective recipients who may qualify later, would
be more equitably and effectively assisted by the general
reduction inaugurated by the board, is solely a question of
administrative discretion vested exclusively in the board and
its administrator. 19
As the Colorado Supreme Court pointed out in Fairllv. Red-
mon,20 if the agency were denied discretion to meet emergent
situations the breach could not be filled. The argument from
financial consequences has not been an unqualified success.
When advanced, not to justify a temporary expedient, but
to support a definitive interpretation of eligibility, the courts
in Washington 21 and Missouri 2 being unimpressed by this
canon of statutory construction. 23
19 Dean v. Brandjord, supra note 17.
20110 P. (2d) 247 (1941).
21 Conant v. State, 197 Wash. 21, 84 P. (2d) 378 (1938) approved
(1939) 13 Social Service Review 105; (1939) 12 So. Calif. L. Rev.
482; criticized (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 711; (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev.
849. Although the holding, that the agency could not consider
support voluntarily furnished by a son-in-law as bearing on the
need of applicant where the legislature had set forth the criteria of
eligibility, is reconcilable with the cases upholding agency discretion
in that the majority were of the opinion the statute was unambigu-
ous, alternative interpretations are that the Washington and Mis-
souri courts construe the statute for themselves or have been con-
fronted with issues on which they held prononunced views. In
Wood v. Waggoner, supra note 18, where the factual situation and
the law were substantially the same as in the Conant case, the
court held that assistance was properly denied.
22 Moore v. State Social Security Comm., 233 Mo. App. 536, 122 S.W.
(2d) 391 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); Price v. State Social Security
Comm., 232 Mo. App. 721, 121 S.W. (2d) 298 (Springfield Ct. App.
1938). Some intransigence in the Court of Appeals is reflected in
cases like the Howlett case, supra note 10, where the Court ofAppeals imposed a duty on the agency to consider the ability of a
son supporting his father to continue the support. For a discussion
of the 1939 amendments, see Redmon v. State Social SecurityComm., 143 S.W. (2d) 168 (Springfield Ct. App. 1940). That the
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Regardless of the manner of submission of the contro-
versy many public assistance cases transcend in importance
the amount at stake in the proceeding before the court.24
The issues cannot be resolved in the proper perspective as a
by-product of litigation without an awareness of such per-
tinent factors as the available appropriation, its adequacy to
meet the calls upon it under the possible interpretations of
the legislative standards for need determination, etc. Com-
plete disclosure of the surrounding circumstances thus verges
on injecting the court into the administrative process. Con-
sequently when a court sustains an administrative policy,
it is not affirming that its own discretion would have been
similarly exercised. More likely the affirmance is defer-
ence, in self-defense, to the specialization of the agency and
an acknowledgment that the agency cannot be said to have
erred. Few issues of social evaluation must be decided in
any one way. "Whether a particular individual is needy,
within the contemplation of the statute, is a question to which
a categorical affirmative or negative answer is rarely pos-
sible. ' 23 The instances when the courts are forced to part
company with the agency on a question of statutory construc-
tion may constitute an exception. Even then the law may
exemplify "the disorderly conduct of words." If a fraternal
home would rather have one of its inmates as a paying guest,
is he in need in contemplation of law ?26 If a father of a
family is receiving a railroad pension check how much there-
of may he allocate for the use of his ineligible wife and minor
children, under a statute providing for a grant of $30 minus
momentum of the 1939 amendments was soon dissipated is shown
by a comparison of the Howlett case with Johns v. State Social
Security Comm. 143 S.V. (2d) 161 (Springfield Ct. App. 1940)
and the Redmon case.
23 But Cf. State ex rel. Eckroth v. Borge, 69 N.D. 1, 283 N.W. 521, 528
(1939).
24" ... trouble cases must be seen as having peculiar power to become
jumping-off points for socially significant normative generalizations.
They are 'naturals' for precedent production. Second, and by the
same token, they are cases in which a uniqueness which may be
accident or misfortune (and may be planned or prophetic) is yet
hard to keep from being mixed into the basis of the normative
generalization. And this means that occasional individuals con-
cerned in trouble cases may acquire a shaping power over their
society." Llewellyn, The PToblem of Juristic Method (1940) 49
Yale L. J. 1355, 1361.25 Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, supra note 16, at 488. See
also Schneberger v. State Board of Welfare, supra note 7, at 861.26 Rasmussen v. Hennepin County, supra note 3.
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net income? Is the entire amount to be regarded as the in-
come of the applicant?27  May the agency prorate among
the members of the family and under what standards, those
obtaining with respect to relief or customary in the com-
munity? Or may the husband be allowed to strip himself
completely? This enumeration, by no means exhaustive, in-
dicates the possibilities open to the agency. Its discretion
is well-nigh absolute with respect to statutory provisions con-
cerning suitability of home.28
However, the attorneys for the State agency would be as
foolhardy to place their reliance on judicial self-suppression
without articulately justifying the reasonableness of the pol-
icy or finding of fact as they would be to submit a due pro-
cess brief citing exclusively presumption of constitutionality
decisions. Care must continually be taken to assure the
fairness of the administrative fair hearing29 and consonance
with the law. From time to time, with all precautions, find-
ings and policy determinations evincing the competence of
the State agency will be reversed, and it may become neces-
sary to calk the statutory seams which have failed to with-
stand pressure, with respect to the scope of judicial review
or the substantive provision over the interpretation of which
there has been disagreement.
"It is well and good for the legislature to confine itself
to formulating general policies, but it may be more important
at times for it to exert its judgment on the application of a
general policy of legislation enacted by another agency than
to waste time ineptly at the start attempting to formulate
the policy."30
If applicants are to be given their measure of security,
that is, the assurance that the conditions of eligibility are
27 Cf. State ex rel. Eckroth v. Borge, supra note 23, at 526, holding that
tax cases construing "income" are inapposite in public assistance.
28 Wilkie v. O'Connor, supra note 6.
29 See Colorado Public Welfare Board v. Viles, 105 Colo. 62, 94 P. (2d)
713 (1939) for the attitude of the courts toward intuition in lieu
of facts. When a fair hearing has been denied, the courts remand
for action on the correct rules of law. Colorado Public Welfare
Board v. Viles, supra. The courts have no jurisdiction to substi-
tute their own judgment as to eligibility or the amount of the
award. People ex rel. Freeman v. Department of Public Welfare,
supra note 16; Howlett v. State Social Security Comm., supra note 9
cf. Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 33 N.E. (2d) 75
(1941).
30 Weeks, Legislative Power versus Delegated Legislative Power (1937)
25 Georgetown L. J. 334, 336, reprinted 4 Select Essays on Con-
stitutional Law 228, 249.
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ascertainable, the court's plain duty on occasion will be to
confine the agency within the bounds prescribed by the leg-
islature and to outline the principles on which it is to pro-
ceed.31 Insistence on administrative elbow room does not
entail hostility to the exercise of the appropriate functions
of the courts. The objective of any welfare administration
is the equitable distribution of available funds to those en-
titled under the law. As the District Court well stated in
the Sweeney case :32
"It [public assistance] is a gratuity from the state made
to those whose status and condition measured by standards
promulgated by the State Board of Public Assistance show
an urgent need for financial aid in order to maintain the high-
est degree of public health, morals and general welfare. It
is not merely an aid to an individual, but an aid to preserve
community life and society, and its administration must be
guided by standards of need prescribed by duly authorized
bodies, here the State Board of Public Assistance. Courts
will proceed with great caution before overthrowing the work
of such boards, since their investigation and study have best
enabled them to determine what regulations will produce the
greatest good for the greatest number, and that is the funda-
mental aim of this democracy."
31 See note 29 supra.
32 Sweeney v. State Board of Public Assistance, 36 F. Supp. 171, 174
(M.D.Pa. 1940).
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